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DIFFERENT AND YET THE SAME? DELICTUAL LIABILITY OF ROADS 
AUTHORITIES IN SCOTLAND AND IN ENGLAND 
 
ELSPETH REID* 
 
Introduction 
 
The “unsurprising…almost natural”1 convergence of the Scots and English law of negligence was 
not long ago confirmed by the House of Lords in Mitchell v Glasgow Corporation,2 in which Lord 
Brown went so far as to dismiss the possibility of crossborder difference in public authority 
liability as “bizarre”.3 Yet from time to time we are reminded that liability rules have not always 
followed the same path, and that uniformity, even now, cannot be taken for granted. Particular 
uncertainty hangs over the liability of local authorities in relation to hazards occurring within their 
road networks. As acknowledged by Lord Rodger in the leading English case of Gorringe v 
Calderdale MBC, “The common law of Scotland is somewhat more generous to those injured due 
to the failure to maintain the roads than was English common law.”4  The background to this 
remark, and its use of the past tense, is that until relatively recently public authorities in England, 
unlike in Scotland, enjoyed extensive immunity from liability for failing to maintain and repair 
highway. Although the principle of immunity has now been abandoned in England, there has 
been no attempt at harmonisation of the statutory and common law framework that underpins 
liability in the two jurisdictions. The continuing distinctiveness of Scots and English law in this 
regard was recently reaffirmed by the Inner House decision in Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council, 
with Lord Drummond Young’s warning of the “dangers in adopting the law of one jurisdiction 
uncritically into the other”. 5 This article traces the history of divergence and convergence 
between the two jurisdictions and asks whether in practical terms difference still matters.  
                                                          
*School of Law, University of Edinburgh. 
1 H. L. MacQueen and D. Sellar, “Negligence”, in K. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds.),  A History of Private Law in 
Scotland, vol 2, (2000) 517 at 546.  
2 2009 S.C. (H.L.) 21 per Lord Hope at para 25. 
3 Para 80. 
4 [2004] UKHL 15; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1057 at para 84. 
5 2014 S.C. 114 at para 54. In the same case Lady Paton, at para 39, recorded her agreement with Lord Macphail’s 
statement in Burnett v Grampian Fire and Rescue Service 2007 S.L.T. 61, at para 34, that the Scots treatment of acts and 
omissions did not directly reflect the English distinction between misfeasance and non-feasance. But see also Lord 
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English law 
 
The immunity principle prior to 1961 
 
The English common law traditionally imposed a duty to maintain public roads and bridges upon 
the adjacent parishes,6  but while the obligation to repair might be enforced by criminal 
indictment, no civil action could be pursued against the parish when it neglected to do so. In the 
landmark case of Russell v Men of Devon,7  the owner of a carriage damaged due to the parlous 
condition of a bridge attempted to recover compensation for his loss from the “men dwelling in 
the county of Devon”. Liability was denied, on the ground that the local community thus 
designated did not constitute a corporation and had no corporate estate out of which payment 
could be made.8  By the early nineteenth century surveyors appointed as agents of the community 
had taken over the obligation to inspect and repair 9, but the equivalent immunity from suit 
continued to be recognised. Similarly, no new liability was seen as having been created when 
these duties were transferred to corporate local authorities, and ultimately to the highway 
authorities created under the Highways Acts.10  The courts distinguished misfeasance from non-
feasance, allowing that responsibility in damages might flow from a positive act by which the 
roadway was made more dangerous,11 but failure to address a hazard did not give rise to liability.12 
Thus the general rule as stated at the close of the nineteenth century was that:13 
 
“By the common law of England...public bodies charged with the duty of keeping public 
roads and bridges in repair, and liable to an indictment for a breach of this duty, were…not 
                                                          
Glennie’s remark in Morton v West Lothian Council 2006 Rep.L.R. 7, aff’d [2008] CSIH 18, at para 64: “Why the law 
should be different in this respect is unclear to me.”  
6  For background see W. W. Mackenzie (ed.), Pratt’s Law of Highways, Main Roads and Bridges 14th edn (1897).  
7 (1788) 2 Term. Rep. 667. 
8 Lord Kenyon also noted, at 671, that there was no precedent for civil liability in this context and that recognition of 
this claim “would have been productive of an infinity of actions”.  
9 In terms of legislation consolidated in the Highway Act 1835 (applicable to England and Wales only). 
10 (Consolidated in the Highways Act 1959.) See, e.g., Parsons v St Mathew, Bethnal Green (1867-68) L.R. 3 C.P. 56; 
Gibson v Mayor of Preston (1869-70) L.R. 5 Q.B. 218. 
11 E.g., Dawson & Co v Bingley Urban District Council [1911] 2 K.B. 149; McClelland v Manchester Corporation [1912] 1 K.B. 
118; Baldwin's Ltd v Halifax Corporation (1916) 14 L.G.R. 787. 
12 Cowley v Newmarket Local Board [1892] A.C. 345. 
13 Municipality of Pictou v Geldert [1893] A.C. 524 per Lord Hobhouse at 527. 
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liable to an action for damages at the suit of a person who had suffered injury from their 
failure to keep the roads and bridges in proper repair.”  
Eventually over the ensuing decades, however, increasing pressure for reform,14 including 
a recommendation by the General Council of the Bar delivered after an especially problematic 
decision in the Court of Appeal,15 led to the enactment of the Highways (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1961. Section 1 abrogated “the rule of law exempting the inhabitants at large and 
any other persons as their successors from liability for non-repair of highways”, thus permitting 
actions to be brought against highways authorities.  
Modern English law 
The current law is found in the Highways Act 1980 (applicable to England and Wales only) 
which in section 41(1) imposes a positive duty upon highways authorities to “maintain” the 
highway, including within the meaning of that term the obligation to repair.16 This is not taken to 
mean that the road must be kept in “perfect” condition;17  those making a claim against roads 
authorities will be required to show that:18 
“(a) the highway was in such a condition that it was dangerous to traffic or pedestrians in 
the sense that, in the ordinary course of human affairs, danger may reasonably have been 
anticipated from its continued use by the public; 
(b) the dangerous condition was created by the failure to maintain or repair the highway; 
and 
(c) the injury or damage resulted from such a failure”. 
 
Section 58 of the 1980 Act further allows a “special defence” in actions based upon failure to 
maintain where the authority can show that it has taken “such care as in all the circumstances was 
                                                          
14 See G. Sawer, “Non-Feasance Revisited” (1955) 18 M.L.R. 541 at 556, urging that “policy as well as elegantia juris 
will be best served if the courts whittle away the immunity doctrines as fast as the concepts permit, so forcing the 
legislatures to provide more detailed and appropriate protections where necessary”; see also A. T. Denning, Note 
(1939) 55 L.Q.R. 343 arguing that the scope of immunity had been misunderstood. 
15 In Burton v West Suffolk County Council [1960] 2 Q.B. 72. For an account of this process see G. Dworkin, “Nonsense 
and nonfeasance – reaction and reform” (1960) 23 M.L.R. 574. 
16 S 329(1). 
17 Goodes v East Sussex County Council [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1356 per Lord Hoffmann at 1361.  
18 Mills v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council [1992] P.I.Q.R. P291 per Dillon L.J. at 293.  
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reasonably required to secure” the highway.19  In determining whether this standard has been 
met, the court is in particular directed to consider: 
 
“(a) the character of the highway, and the traffic which was reasonably to be expected to 
use it; 
(b) the standard of maintenance appropriate for a highway of that character and used by 
such traffic; 
(c) the state of repair in which a reasonable person would have expected to find the 
highway; 
(d) whether the highway authority knew, or could reasonably have been expected to know, 
that the condition of the part of the highway to which the action relates was likely to cause 
danger to users of the highway; 
(e) where the highway authority could not reasonably have been expected to repair that 
part of the highway before the cause of action arose, what warning notices of its condition 
had been displayed”. 
 
The duty entailed under section 41(1) is readily regarded as encompassing due attention 
to specific physical hazards such as potholes,20 loose or uneven paving,21 or faulty drainage.22 
However, it does not extend to other safety improvement functions with which highway 
authorities are charged by statute, such the provision of information, whether by street furniture 
or painted signage.23  
 
Aside from issues of maintenance and repair the courts have been reluctant to recognise 
that the creation of a power to make improvements also entails a duty of care in tort to 
individuals who may be affected if they are not made. As held in Stovin v Wise, decisions on safety 
enhancements are a matter for the authority’s discretion, which should not be displaced by 
                                                          
19 E.g. Griffiths v Liverpool Corporation [1967] 1 Q.B. 374; Wilkinson v York City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 207; [2011] 
P.T.S.R. D39. 
20 E.g. AC v Devon County Council [2013] EWCA Civ 418; [2014] R.T.R. 1. 
21 E.g. Dalton v Nottinghamshire County Council [2011] EWCA Civ 776. 
22 E.g. Mitchell v Department for Transport [2006] 1 W.L.R. 3356; Vernon Knights Associates v Cornwall Council [2013] 
EWCA Civ 950; [2014] Env. LR 6. 
23 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1057 per Lord Hoffmann at para 15. 
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imposition of duty of care in tort.24 By the same token, duty of care to individual road users does 
not normally follow where a statutory provision has imposed a general public law duty upon the 
roads authority. In the leading case of Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council the claimant 
driver was injured in a collision with another vehicle as she attempted to negotiate a bend in the 
road at the crest of a hill where there had been no warning signs. The House of Lords was not 
persuaded that the local authority’s neglect of signage was a culpable failure to maintain in terms 
of section 41(1). Nor did it consider that a duty to the claimant flowed from the authority’s 
responsibilities under section 39(2)(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, requiring roads authorities to 
undertake measures “designed to promote road safety”. The Act made no express provision for 
an action for breach of statutory duty, and it was “difficult to imagine” how such a duty could be 
founded “simply upon the failure (however irrational) to provide some benefit which a public 
authority has power (or a public law duty) to provide.”25  
 
Exceptionally duty may be recognised as deriving from the existence of a statutory power 
in this context, but the “minimum preconditions” are that it would have been “irrational” on the 
part of the authority not to have exercised the power, and that there are “exceptional grounds” 
for holding that compensation is due to those injured thereby; or alternatively duty might exist 
where the public authority had created “an expectation that the power would be used and the 
plaintiff had suffered damage from reliance on that expectation”.26 However, while authorities 
normally warn of potential hazards, such as the road configuration encountered in Gorringe there 
can be no expectation that they will always do so. As Lord Rodger remarked in that case “Drivers 
must take care for themselves and drive at an appropriate speed, irrespective of whether or not 
there is a warning sign.”27 
 
With the disappearance of the immunity principle the distinction between non-feasance 
and misfeasance has ceased to be crucial in relation to maintenance and repair, but plainly 
                                                          
24 [1996] A.C. 923 per Lord Hoffmann at 958. In that case the plaintiff motorcyclist was injured in a collision with a 
car as it exited a junction where visibility was obscured by a high bank on adjoining land. Section 79 of the Highways 
Act 1980 empowers authorities to require landowners to remove features that obstruct the view of road users but 
this statutory power did not provide the basis for a common law duty to remove the source of danger. 
25 [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1057 per Lord Hoffmann at para 32. 
26 [1996] A.C. 923 per Lord Hoffmann at 953 (citing the example of a lighthouse authority which, by exercising its 
power to maintain lighthouses, creates an expectation that the light will warn sailors of danger, so that it owes a duty 
not to extinguish the light without notice). See also Gorringe v Calderdale [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1057 per Lord Hoffmann at 
para 43. 
27 [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1057 at para 93. 
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inaction has always regarded differently from action when an authority has failed to address a 
dangerous obstruction on the highway.28 As Lord Nicholls reminded the court in Stovin v Wise, 
there must be special justification for compelling a person “to act, and to act for the benefit of 
another”, whether a private person or a public authority.29 The outcome of Stovin v Wise, where 
the authority has failed to address a potential hazard, may thus be contrasted with cases where 
the authority itself has introduced the offending feature. In Yetkin v Mahmood,30 for example, an 
authority which planted shrubbery at a pedestrian crossing in such a way as to obscure the view 
of oncoming traffic was found liable to an unsighted pedestrian who had stepped out into the 
path of a car. Similarly, the result of a case such as Gorringe would likely have been different if the 
authority had provided a misleading sign instead of no sign at all.31 Unreasonable risks cannot be 
disregarded simply because they have been created by a third party.32 Similarly, the law of 
nuisance may be invoked where an authority has unreasonably failed to address a hazard created 
by the forces of nature,33 but it is rare for liability to be imposed on a highway authority for 
continuing a nuisance which it did not itself create.34  
 
Finally, the English law of public nuisance provides a limited remedy where local authorities 
have been responsible for obstructions on public thoroughfares.35 The key element is that a 
“common injury” should have been suffered “by members of the public by interference with rights 
enjoyed by them as such”,36 but the right of action is narrowly confined to those claimants who 
can demonstrate that they have suffered “particular damage” over and above that suffered by the 
community more generally.37   
                                                          
28 On the narrow distinction between errors of omission and commission in this context, however, see Valentine v 
Transport for London [2010] EWCA Civ 1358; [2011] R.T.R. 24 paras 29-34. 
29 [1996] A.C. 923 at 930. 
30 [2011] Q.B. 827. See also Kane v New Forest District Council [2002] 1 W.L.R. 312. 
31 W. E. Peel and J. Goudkamp (eds.), Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort 19th edn (2014) para 5–071. 
32 E.g. Simon v Islington Borough Council [1943] K.B. 188; Roe v Sheffield City Council [2004] Q.B. 653. 
33 E.g. Chapman v Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council [1997] 2 EGLR 141 (diseased tree falling on highway). 
34 E.g. Noble v Harrison [1926] 2 K.B. 332 (instability of fallen tree would not have been apparent to ordinary 
inspection); Ali v Bradford Metropolitan District Council [2012] 1 W.L.R. 161 (accumulation of mud). 
35 E.g. Penny v Wimbledon Urban District Council [1899] 2 Q.B. 72; Westminster City Council v Ocean Leisure Ltd [2005] 1 P. 
& C.R. 25; Wildtree Hotels Ltd v Harrow London Borough Council [2001] 2 A.C. 1. 
36 R v Rimmington [2006] 1 A.C. 459 per Lord Bingham at para 6 (a case involving the criminal offence of public 
nuisance). 
37 See G. Kodilinye, “Public Nuisance and Particular Damage in the Modern Law” (1986) 6 Legal Studies 182. 
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The modern English rules are thus summed up in the words of Lord Scott in Gorringe:38 
 
“…if a highway authority is in breach of its duty under section 41(1)… it can be sued if 
damage is thereby caused. If it is to escape liability it must bring itself within the section 58 
defence. In addition, a highway authority may be liable at common law for damage 
attributable to dangers that it has introduced, or, in the case of dangers introduced by some 
third party, that it has unreasonably failed to abate. Members of the public who drive cars 
on the highways of this country are entitled to expect that the highways will be kept 
properly in repair. They are entitled to complain if damage is caused by some obstruction 
or condition of the road or its surroundings that constitutes a public nuisance. And they 
are, of course, entitled to complain if they suffer damage by the negligence of some other 
user of the highway. But an overriding imperative is that those who drive on public 
highways do so in a manner and at a speed that is safe having regard to such matters as the 
nature of the road, the weather conditions and the traffic conditions. Drivers are first and 
foremost themselves responsible for their own safety.” 
 
Snow and ice 
 
Until recently the duty of public authorities to maintain the highway under the Highways Act 
1980, section 41, was held not to extend to preventing the formation of ice or removing snow 
from the road, and there was, moreover, no common law duty so to do.39 However, by 
amendment to the 1980 Act in 2003, section 41(1A) now encompasses  “a duty to ensure, so far 
as is reasonably practicable, that safe passage along a highway is not endangered by snow or 
ice”.40  
 
Scots law 
 
History of liability  
 
                                                          
38 [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1057 at para 76. 
39 Goodes v East Sussex County Council [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1356, overruling Haydon v Kent County Council [1978] Q.B. 343 on 
this point. See also Sandhar v Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1632 (accident in 
1996). 
40 Highways Act 1980 s 41(1A), added by Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003, s 111. 
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“From time immemorial” the management and maintenance of streets in the Scottish royal 
burghs was by common law and usage vested in the Magistrates and Council of those burghs.41 
Outwith the burghs, statutory provision from the seventeenth century onwards placed 
responsibility for maintenance of public roads upon local Commissioners and Justices of the 
Peace who were empowered to order the “mending of all highways and passages” within their 
jurisdiction.42 This means that from an early stage specific public officers were entrusted with this 
function, in contrast with England where responsibility traditionally rested with the parishes. In 
the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, an increasing number of turnpike (toll) roads were 
added to the network, each enabled by Act of Parliament and managed by its own board of 
Trustees.43 Eventually the Roads and Bridges (Scotland) Act 1878 provided a framework by 
which management and maintenance of the road network was placed within the remit of the 
relevant local authorities – at that time the County Councils and the Burgh Councils.44  
 
Unlike in England, there was no suggestion in the early case law that immunity should be 
allowed to those charged with the maintenance of roads and bridges. In Innes v Magistrates of 
Edinburgh,45 it was held that the local magistrates were liable to a person injured by falling into a 
hole in a city street. A pit had been dug and left unfenced overnight by workmen constructing 
what is now known as the Old College building for the University of Edinburgh. Although these 
works had been on the orders of the University, the court held the city magistrates liable, since it 
was the duty of the latter to “take care that the streets of the city are kept in such a state as to 
prevent the slightest danger to passengers. They are liable for the smallest neglect of this duty, 
and in this case, without some degree of culpa on their part, the pursuer could not have met with 
                                                          
41 D. Ferguson, The Law of Roads, Streets and Rights of Way, Bridges and Ferries in Scotland (1904) 181. 
42 APS 1617, c. 8; APS 1661, c. 38. Subsequent legislation allowed for the commandeering of a labour contribution 
from the local population for road construction and maintenance (APS 1669, c. 16), a system which was not finally 
abolished until 1883 (Roads and Bridges (Scotland) Act 1878, s 33).  For an outline of early history see Report of the 
Commissioners for Inquiring into Matters relating to Public Roads in Scotland  (1859) xi-xvii; H. Barclay, Law of Highways in 
Scotland 4th edn. (1863).  
43 See e.g. Act 1713, c. 12, An Act for upholding and repairing the Bridges and Highways in the county of 
Edinburgh. This body of legislation was consolidated in the General Turnpike Act 1831, reproduced with 
commentary in H. Barclay, Law of Highways in Scotland 4th edn. (1863) 9-76. 
44 See s 11. For commentary on the 1878 Act see J. Eaton Dykes, Manual of the Roads and Bridges (Scotland) Act, 1878 
(1890). 
45 (1789) Mor. 13189. 
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the misfortune.”46 The decision in Innes was delivered less than three months after that of the 
English court in Russell v Men of Devon, but an important point of difference in the Scottish case 
was that, unlike the Men of Devon, the defenders as the Magistrates of Edinburgh could be 
regarded as representing a corporate body with funds out of which the claim could be met. Thus 
the principle of immunity developed in the English case law did not initially take hold in 
Scotland, and Innes was followed by a number of further cases in which no suggestion was made 
that those parties charged with maintenance of the roads, in the burghs or elsewhere, were to be 
exempted from liability for errors of commission or omission.47 
 
“Law from over the border”: Duncan v Findlater 
 
For a brief period in the mid-nineteenth century, law was imported “from over the border”48 
following the decision of the House of Lords in the Scots case of Duncan v Findlater in 1839. In 
that case the pursuer claimed damages in respect of injuries suffered in an accident on a turnpike 
road in which he had been hurt and his son killed. Workmen employed by the road trustees to 
construct a drain had left a pile of stones unattended on the roadway overnight, and the pursuer’s 
carriage had collided with it. The Lord Ordinary, upheld unanimously by the Inner House, 
allowed his claim, holding that there was ample authority to support the imposition of liability 
upon the trustees “with full relief to them against the trust-funds levied for the roads.”49 A 
contrary rule in English law was noted but seen as attributable to the different institutional 
framework south of the border.50 The House of Lords, however, dismissed the 
“supposed...conflict” between English and Scots law on this point,51 and reasoned that it was not 
the intention of the turnpike roads legislation52 that the funds under the road trustees’ 
                                                          
46 Reference was made also to D.43.8.2.24 (care of urban roads lies with the magistrates) and D.9.2.29.7 (municipal 
magistrates may be liable under the lex Aquilia if they do any damage unlawfully). 
47 E.g., Mackay v Waddell (1820) 2 Mur 201; Maclachlan v Road Trustees (1827) 4 Mur 216; Millar v Road Trustees (1828) 4 
Mur 563; Aitken v Douglas (1836) 14 S 204; Dauney v Maxwell (1836) 14 S 1037. 
48 The House of Lords decision in this case was subjected to detailed criticism in A. Dewar Gibb, Law from Over the 
Border (1950) 109-112. 
49 (1838) 16 S. 1150 per Lord Corehouse at 1154. 
50 (1838) 16 S. 1150 per Lord President Hope at 1154: “attempts were made in England to render the trustees 
personally liable, and…these were very properly resisted and defeated. But there is no attempt here to make the 
trustees personally liable, but only to subject the trust-funds. I think it clear, that, according to the law of Scotland, 
the trust-funds are liable, and that the trustees, qua trustees, are liable.” 
51 (1839) Macl. & R. 911 per Lord Cottenham at 928 (distinguishing Innes and subsequent case law). 
52 General Turnpike Act 1831, ss 10-11. 
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management should be used to compensate those injured by the improper acts of trustees’ 
employees.53 The decision of the Court of Session was therefore set aside, and from then on the 
Scots courts followed Duncan v Findlater to deny liability on the part of roads trustees,54 although 
they did not consider themselves bound by its reasoning outwith the context of turnpike roads. It 
remained competent to claim damages from magistrates in the burghs for failure to maintain 
roads within their control, and the authority of Innes v Magistrates of Edinburgh was upheld to that 
extent.55  
 
Less than thirty later, however, English law took a different turn in regard to the liability 
of trustees. In Mersey Docks v Gibbs56  the House of Lords ruled that the funds of a docks trust 
incorporated by statute might be applied to indemnifying the owners of a ship and cargo 
damaged due to the negligence of the trust’s employees. Reference was made to Duncan v Findlater 
as based upon a “misapprehension” in precluding action against trustees for the negligence of the 
trust’s employees.57 Thereafter the Scots courts seized upon the authority of Mersey Docks v Gibbs 
once again to recognise liability on the part of statutory roads trustees and commissioners.58   
 
The brief career of the immunity principle in Scotland was thus brought to an end, and 
no limitation of liability was read into the changes effected by the Roads and Bridges (Scotland) 
Act 1878,59  just as in England no new liability had been entailed in the transfer of responsibilities 
                                                          
53 (1839) Macl. & R. 911 per Lord Cottenham at 936. 
54 As Lord Gillies observed in Ainslie v Stewart (1839) 12 Scottish Jurist 178 at 179, “We can do nothing else, since the 
reversal in Findlater’s case; for it appears that what is the law of England is now the law of Scotland.” 
55 Dargie v Magistrates of Forfar (1855) 17 D. 730; Kerr v Magistrates of Stirling (1858) 21 D. 169 
56 (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 93. The plaintiffs had been “entitled to expect” that reasonable care would be taken that their 
property would not be exposed to danger (per Lord Blackburn at 107). 
57 (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 93 per Lord Westbury at 107. For commentary on Duncan v Findlater and Mersey Docks v Gibbs 
and their impact upon the practice of Scots courts see Virtue v Commissioners of Police of Alloa (1873) 1 R.  285 per Lord 
President Inglis at 292-297. For a robust defence of Duncan v Findlater see J. H. Tait, “Is Duncan v. Findlater not Law?” 
(1898) 10 Jur. Rev. 200. 
58 See Virtue v Commissioners of Police of Alloa (1873) 1 R. 285 (court of seven judges). Meanwhile William Guthrie, in 
editing the 6th edition of Bell’s Principles in 1872, added the following text to § 2031 (retained in subsequent editions): 
“statutory trustees and local authorities, unless the statutes under which they act provide otherwise, are liable to 
make good in their corporate capacity and out of their corporate funds the damage caused by their own or their 
servants’ fault, in the same way as individuals. The magistrates of a burgh, being charged with the duty of keeping the 
streets in good order, are liable in damages to persons injured by their being in an unsafe condition.”  
59 See, e.g., Greer v County Road Trustees of the County of Stirling (1882) 9 R 1069; M’Fee v Police Commissioners of Broughty-
Ferry (1890) 17 R 764; Nelson v County Council of the Lower Ward of Lanarkshire (1891) 19 R. 311.   
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to local roads authorities. Duncan v Findlater had therefore caused only a “temporary eclipse” in 
the general principle that:60 
 
“parliamentary trustees and Local Authorities constituted by Act of Parliament, although 
performing their duties without remuneration and without any view to profit, are 
responsible for negligence in the same manner as railway companies or other corporations 
who carry on public undertakings for profit.” 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, the Scots and English law were 
manifestly not the same.61 In England highway authorities were immune from suit in relation to 
faire to repair, while their Scots counterparts enjoyed no such protection in performance of their 
common law or statutory responsibilities. Moreover, the important distinction between 
misfeasance and nonfeasance, pivotal to the operation of the immunity principle in England, had 
no special significance in Scotland beyond the general principle of treating errors of commission 
more severely than those of omission. A further dissimilarity was that in England the existence of 
a statutory complaints procedure appeared to exclude the possibility of civil liability for non-
fulfilment of duties under the same statute,62 whereas the Scots courts enforced no such 
exclusionary rule where the two remedies were “manifestly... of a different kind”.63 These points 
of difference were to continue up until the 1961 reform in England. The English textbooks 
would deal in brief with tort liability of roads authorities, since for the most part they were 
protected by immunity,64 while in contrast the Scots texts instanced diverse categories of 
actionable failure to act.65  
 
The modern law: crossborder difference?  
 
Maintenance and repair 
                                                          
60 Strachan v County Council of Aberdeenshire (1894) 21 R. 915 per Lord McLaren at 920. 
61 Contrast this statement with the dictum cited at text to fn 13. For a contemporary comparison see A. M. MacRobert, 
“The liability of public bodies for non-feasance” (1902) 14 Jur. Rev. 158. 
62 See Robinson v Mayor and Corporation of the Borough of Workington [1897] 1 Q.B. 619. 
63 Strachan v County Council of Aberdeenshire (1894) 21 R 915 per Lord President Robertson at 919 
64 E.g., R.F.V. Heuston (ed.), Salmond on the Law of Torts 13th edn (1961) § 69 (although it should be noted that the 
immunity principle, and its distinction between non-feasance from misfeasance, was directly relevant only to the 
repairing obligations of highway authorities).  
65 E.g., A.T. Glegg, The Law of Reparation in Scotland 4th edn by J.L. Duncan (1955) 301-304. 
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The role of the roads authorities in respect of the management and maintenance of public roads 
is now detailed in the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984. Section 1(1) states that local authorities “shall 
manage and maintain” all public roads within their area, with the exception of trunk roads, for 
which responsibility falls upon the Scottish Ministers.66 The Scottish provisions, like the English, 
define maintenance as including “repair”.67 The 1984 Act also empowers authorities to 
implement a variety of safety enhancements including footways, pedestrian bridges and subways, 
traffic “islands”, fencing, flood and snow defences, lighting and traffic calming, etc.68 But while 
the duty of care owed by roads authorities to road users arises out of the functions now specified 
by statute, that duty was established at common law “well before the modern statutory system of 
roads legislation came into being" and unlike in England does not itself require to be “spelled out 
of any statutory power”.69 That said, the list of hazards triggering the Scots common law duty to 
maintain and repair, such as uneven or insecure paving stones,70 or craters or sinkholes on the 
carriageway,71 bears a strong resemblance to list of those which have been held to give rise to 
duty under section 41(1) of the English Highways Act 1980.72  
 
There is no Scots equivalent to the English “special defence” set out in section 58 of the 
1980 Act in regard to failure to maintain and repair. The historical explanation is obvious. The 
English defence was introduced in order to counterbalance the abolition of immunity for non-
repair in 1961, but since the Scottish roads authorities had not enjoyed such immunity their 
common law duties to road users had already been defined and delimited by the case law.  But at 
the same time, breach of duty is in practice relatively difficult to establish in Scotland if a hazard 
has arisen due to a failure to maintain. Even if there was a foreseeable risk of injury, the pursuer 
must show that it was reasonable and practicable for the authority to have been alerted to the 
                                                          
66 S 2, and managed by Transport Scotland (http://www.transportscotland.gov.uk/road/prioritising-and-maintaining-scotlands-
trunk-road-network). 
67 S 151(1). 
68 Ss 25-40. 
69 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council 2014 S.C. 114 per Lord Drummond Young at para 78; see also Gibson v Orr 1999 
S.C. 420 per Lord Hamilton at 435 explaining that this is “a duty not directly under the statute but a duty arising out 
of the relationship between those authorities and road users created by the control vested by statute in the former 
over the public roads in their charge”. 
70 Laing v Paull & Williamsons 1912 S.C. 196; Rush v Glasgow Corporation 1947 S.C. 580. 
71 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council 2014 S.C. 114 per Lady Paton at para 36. 
72 See fnn 20, 21, 22 above. 
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danger and to have taken action before the accident occurred.73 In respect of potholes and 
irregularities in the road surface, for example, this would require the pursuer to prove that an 
“inspection in accordance with a practice common to roads authorities would have revealed the 
defect or that some special and exceptional circumstances, such as numerous previous complaints 
about the defect, made it reasonable and practicable to inspect the locus before the accident 
occurred”.74 The pursuer is expected to specify such matters as the intervals at which inspection 
ought reasonably to have taken place,75 although the failure by a roads authority properly to 
implement its own repairs and maintenance policy is likely to be considered significant in this 
regard.76 In sum, the considerations expressly brought to the English courts’ attention by section 
58 overlap very significantly with the factors relevant to determining the common-law standard 
of care for Scots authorities. Indeed a non-statutory code of practice used across the UK, Well-
maintained Highways: Code of Practice for Highway Maintenance Management,77 endorsed by the 
Scottish Government, has been recognised as a suitable benchmark in English and Scots cases.78 
In both jurisdictions, therefore, the authority may escape liability where it has exercised 
reasonable care in maintenance and repair, although there remains the important practical 
difference that in England the onus is upon the authority to prove that it has done so, whereas in 
Scotland it is for the injured party to prove that it has not.79  
 
                                                          
73 Gibson v Strathclyde Regional Council 1993 S.L.T. 1243. 
74 Hutchison v North Lanarkshire Council [2007] CSOH 23 per Lord Brodie at para 16, agreeing with the defenders’ 
submissions; see also Nugent v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 88; 2009 G.W.D. 24-392. 
75 Letford v Glasgow City Council 2002 Rep.L.R. 107 per Sheriff Principal Bowen at para 3. 
76 In McGovern v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 148; 2010 Rep.L.R. 2 the defenders failed in their duty where their 
own practice had been to fix potholes deeper than 40mm and an inspection of the locus shortly before the accident 
did not identify the 70 mm pothole into which the pursuer subsequently fell. See also Thorpe v Aberdeen City Council 
2007 Rep.L.R. 105.  
77 Compiled by the Roads Liaison Group and endorsed by the Department of Transport, Scottish Government and 
others. The 2005 edition, revised in 2013 is available at http://www.ukroadsliaisongroup.org/en/utilities/document-
summary.cfm?docid=C7214A5B-66E1-4994-AA7FBAC360DC5CC7. 
78 See e.g. Ryder v Highland Council 2013 S.L.T. 847; Wilkinson v York City Council [2011] EWCA Civ 207; [2011] 
P.T.S.R. D39. Evidence of compliance with the Code suggests that the authority has met the appropriate standard, 
but it does not do so conclusively, and, by the same token, the Code’s recommendations cannot be regarded as 
mandatory: see AC v Devon County Council [2013] EWCA Civ 418; [2014] R.T.R. 1. See also discussion in Nugent v 
Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 88; 2009 G.W.D. 24-392.  
79 See Goodes v East Sussex County Council [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1356 per Lord Clyde at 1368, explaining with regard to 
section 58 that “Such a reversal of the onus…is justifiable by the consideration that the plaintiff is not likely to know 
or be able readily to ascertain in what respects the authority has failed in its duty.” 
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Dangerous obstructions 
 
Aside from entailing maintenance and repair, the Scots common-law duty requires care to be 
taken “to see that there shall be no dangerous obstruction” on roads or pathways under the 
authority’s control,80 regardless of whether that source of danger was introduced by the roads 
authority itself or another party,81 and whether it is attributable to fault of design or construction 
or to decay.82 Duty is construed narrowly, however, and only in relation to “significant risk” – in 
particular those hazards that the careful road user could not be expected to detect.83 In addition 
to faults of design or construction,84 or failure to make a site safe after building works,85 this 
might include, for example, trees collapsing upon the highway,86 or low bridges with insufficient 
warning that they make the road impassable for high vehicles.87 In McKnight v Clydeside Buses, for 
example, the pursuer’s young daughter was killed when the double-decker bus in which she was 
travelling smashed into a low railway bridge across a city street. In the absence of warning signs 
the height of the bridge was a “manifest danger to road users”, and the roads authority had failed 
in its “duty to take steps to remedy the obvious hazard which is known to exist: it cannot ignore 
its duty to act in the interests of public safety”.88  
 
The “critical question” in determining the scope of duty is whether the alleged hazard 
presented “a significant risk of an accident to a person proceeding along the road in question 
with due skill and care”.89 Duty does not therefore extend to the introduction of safety 
improvements in relation to dangers which the careful road user might in any event be expected 
to notice in time and negotiate without incident. In contrast with the low bridge in McKnight, 
                                                          
80 M’Fee v Police Commissioners of Broughty-Ferry (1890) 17 R. 764 per Lord Justice Clerk Macdonald at 767. 
81Laing v Paull & Williamsons 1912 S.C. 196; Brierley v County Council of Midlothian 1921 1 S.L.T. 192; McKnight v Clydeside 
Buses Ltd 1999 S.L.T. 1167; see also Black v Glasgow Corporation 1959 S.C. 188.   
82 Laing v Paull & Williamsons 1912 S.C. 196. 
83 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council 2014 S.C. 114 per Lord Drummond Young at paras 64 and 80. 
84 E.g. Kemp v Glasgow City Council 2000 S.L.T. 471, in which the pursuer tripped on the raised edge of the kerb. The 
court was persuaded that the authority had not met the appropriate standard of care and that “the absence of any 
recognised design [in any design manual] for such a feature militates against the wisdom of constructing it” (per Lord 
Osbourne at 474). 
85 Letford v Glasgow City Council 2002 Rep.L.R. 107 (pothole left after removal of a lighting column). 
86 Brierley v County Council of Midlothian 1921 1 S.L.T. 192; Mackie v Dumbartonshire County Council 1927 S.C. (H.L.) 99. 
87 M’Fee v Police Commissioners of Broughty-Ferry (1890) 17 R. 764.   
88 1999 S.L.T. 1167 per Lady Cosgrove at 1172. 
89 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council 2014 S.C. 114 per Lord Drummond Young at para 85. 
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examples of features in this latter category include missing road markings and warning signs at 
junctions.90 In Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council, the pursuer had been injured and her passengers 
killed in a collision when she drove out of a minor road on to a trunk road without stopping. The 
double white lines on the roadway had become eroded, and the pursuer alleged that the roads 
authority had breached its duty of care towards road users in failing to attend to inadequate 
signage at the junction. However, the court took the view that the road configuration was 
suggestive of an obvious danger, so that a careful driver would have approached it slowly, 
keeping a careful look out.91 There was therefore no hazard in the sense indicated above, and a 
duty of care to reinstate markings and signage was not made out. Taking a broader view, Lord 
Drummond Young explained that the system of insurance deals with accidents caused by careless 
driving, but not those which are “caused by a hazard that a careful driver would not see”, and it is 
therefore in those circumstances that the imposition of duty upon the roads authorities “fulfils a 
useful, if limited, function in the system of accident compensation”.92 
 
If comparison is now made with English law in this area, it is difficult to identify 
significant divergence in the criteria by which hazardous situations are judged to give rise to duty. 
The English immunity rule did not operate in this context, so that in both jurisdictions duty 
might be imposed in relation to features which the authority was itself responsible for 
introducing. However, Scots law, like English law,93 has traditionally recognised common law 
duty only sparingly in relation to dangers introduced by a third party, or caused by natural 
forces.94 Nothwithstanding statutory powers and duties to make good potential risk, the premise 
in both jurisdictions is that the statutory functions of roads authorities do not relieve road users 
of the obligation to take care for their own safety, and duty of care is unlikely to be imposed in 
relation to features which should readily have been navigated safely. As Lord Drummond Young 
remarked in Macdonald, “much of what is said in Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council 
supports the general approach of the Scottish common law”.95 
                                                          
90 Murray v Nicholls 1983 S.L.T. 194. 
91 Cf Bird v Pearce [1979] R.T.R. 369 in which the roads authority had itself obliterated the white lines during road 
works in such a way as to create a kind of “trap” for drivers. 
92 2014 S.C. 114 at para 80. 
93 Text to fnn 32-24 above.  
94E.g. falling trees where a reasonable inspection procedure would have identified the threat of accident: Brierley v 
County Council of Midlothian 1921 1 S.L.T. 192; Mackie v Dumbartonshire County Council 1927 S.C. (H.L.) 99; Chapman v 
Barking and Dagenham London Borough Council [1997] 2 E.G.L.R. 141. 
95 2014 S.C. 114 at para 83. 
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Finally, the term “public nuisance” is sometimes used loosely in Scots law where a 
number of proprietors have been affected, but unlike in English law it does not denote a criminal 
offence in Scots law, nor a category of civil liability distinct from the general law of nuisance.96 
Since this is a relatively narrow doctrine in English law, this does not represent a major source of 
crossborder difference. In any event, Scots proprietors whose premises front on to a street 
affected by an obstruction on the carriageway have title and interest to sue in nuisance,97 although 
in practice, the common law liability of roads authorities has traditionally been regarded as 
governed not by nuisance but by the ordinary principles of negligence.98  
 
Snow and ice 
 
Numerous Scots cases have involved the hazards presented by snow and ice. Section 34 of the 
Roads (Scotland) Act 1984, requiring roads authorities to “take such steps as they consider 
reasonable to prevent snow and ice endangering the safe passage of pedestrians and vehicles over 
public roads”, does not in itself create an additional statutory remedy for road users where snow 
or ice has not been cleared. At the same time it is uncontentious that the common law duty owed 
by roads authorities to road users may in principle extend to this task.99 It is also clear that black 
ice in particular may constitute a hazard in the sense discussed above since it can take even the 
most careful driver by surprise.100 Nonetheless, it has proved extremely difficult for accident 
victims to establish that the roads authority has failed in a duty of care to treat a particular 
locus.101  
                                                          
96 Bell, Prin § 974. 
97 E.g. Ogston v Aberdeen District Tramways Co (1896) 24 R. (H.L.) 8; Globe (Aberdeen) Ltd v North of Scotland Water 
Authority 2000 S.C. 392. 
98 N. Whitty, “Nuisance”, in T. B. Smith et al (eds.), The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001), § 
166. 
99 Syme v Scottish Borders Council 2003 S.L.T. 601; Rainford v Aberdeenshire Council 2007 Rep.L.R. 126. This was also a 
matter of concession in Ryder v Highland Council 2013 S.L.T. 847.  
100 Although Lord Drummond Young observed in Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council  2014 S.C. 114 at para 70 that 
careful drivers will “drive in such a way as to minimise the risk of skidding on black ice”, the evidence in cases such 
as Morton v West Lothian Council 2006 Rep.L.R. 7, aff’d [2008] CSIH 18 indicates that careful driving cannot eliminate 
that risk; in that case there was no suggestion that the pursuer was driving carelessly when her car skidded on black 
ice, and witnesses spoke to a series of vehicles skidding at the scene thereafter, even although they had been alerted 
to the need to drive with care.  
101 See discussion by Lord Drummond Young in Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council 2014 S.C. 114 at para 70. 
17 
 
 
Clearance of snow and ice present particular logistic problems for the Scottish roads 
authorities,102 and therefore any attempt to challenge an authority’s scheme of priorities in 
treating its roads is vulnerable to the objection that roads authorities must have discretion to 
decide in these matters in the light of the resources and specialised information available to them. 
Unless it has acted unreasonably, for example in ignoring that information, the courts are 
reluctant to interfere in the authority’s exercise of its discretion by ruling that the authority was 
under a duty to treat the accident locus earlier,103 although a claim may have greater prospects of 
success if, rather than disputing the authority’s system of priorities, the accident victim can show 
that it has failed properly to implement that system in the light of the information available.104   
 
Even where duty is recognised, however, the transient nature of winter road conditions 
means that establishing breach of duty is problematic. In Morton v West Lothian Council,105 for 
example, the pursuer allowed that gritting lorries had passed by the locus of the accident, but 
invited the court to infer from the presence of black ice shortly afterwards that they had 
negligently failed to spread salt over that particular stretch of roadway. Given competing 
explanations for this phenomenon, including the possibility that rainfall has washed the salt from 
the road surface, this was not accepted. Similar challenges are met in specifying the steps which 
might reasonably have taken to have prevented the occurrence of the accident.106 In Ryder v 
Highland Council for example, even if the pursuer had succeeded in his argument that defenders 
had a duty to operate their gritting lorries round the clock, it was by no means evident that such 
treatment would have stopped the formation of ice at the accident locus, especially in the light of 
other weather variables, again including the possibility of rain washing salt from the road.107  
                                                          
102 Macdonald v Scottish Ministers 2004 Rep.L.R. 16 per Lord Clarke at para 8, noting the impossibility in large areas 
such as the Highlands of ensuring that all black ice is treated simultaneously and continuously so as to avoid the risk 
of skidding. 
103 Cameron v Inverness-shire County Council 1935 S.C. 493; Grant v Lothian Regional Council 1988 S.L.T. 533; Syme v Scottish 
Borders Council 2003 S.L.T. 601. See also Ryder v Highland Council 2013 S.L.T. 847 in which the pursuer’s mother was 
killed when her car skidded off an untreated road in the early morning. His argument that the roads authority had a 
duty to maintain a 24-hour system for gritting, rather than interrupting its service overnight, was similarly rejected as 
raising an issue of operational priorities that was non-justiciable 
104 McGeouch v Strathclyde Regional Council 1985 S.L.T. 321 allowing proof before answer on this point. 
105 2006 Rep.L.R. 7, aff’d [2008] CSIH 18; see also Gibson v West Lothian Council [2011] CSOH 110; 2011 Rep.L.R. 84, 
aff’d [2012] CSIH 62. 
106 Macdonald v Scottish Ministers 2004 Rep.L.R. 16. 
107 2013 S.L.T. 847 per Lord Tyre at paras 56-57. 
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Earlier dicta in Scots cases to the effect that there is no right to sue English roads 
authorities in these circumstances plainly no longer hold good,108 but up-to-date comparison with 
English law is difficult since few reported cases have followed from the 2003 reform by which 
English authorities were charged with duty to clear snow and ice from the highway.109  Since the 
obligation imposed upon English authorities is expressed as ensuring safe passage “so far as is 
reasonably practicable”, it seems probable that the developing English law will be shaped by 
similar concerns to limit the justiciability of the authorities’ decision-making on allocation of 
resources. And it goes without saying that the practical problems of proving breach of duty are 
likely to replicate those already encountered in the Scots common law. 
Conclusion 
“English law is different from Scots law”110 in determining the delictual liability of roads 
authorities. The statutory sources from which the authorities’ powers and duties are derived are 
quite separate, and the interplay between those sources and the common law rules dissimilar. In 
the past this has meant major substantive difference between the two jurisdictions. A century ago 
some Scots argued in the pages of this journal for harmonisation by assimilating Scots with 
English law and returning to Duncan v Findlater,111 In the event it was English law that aligned 
itself closer to Scots law, with the abandonment of immunity for failure to repair, and, more 
lately, with the integration of liability for failure to clear snow and ice within the general rule on 
mainenance. This is perhaps why Lord Rodger used the past tense when noting the relative 
generosity of Scots law towards the pursuer,112 for a survey of the modern law provides little hard 
evidence of a more exacting approach in the English courts, even in relation to the omissions of 
highways authorities. Concern for a fair allocation of risk within a common insurance framework 
means that in both jurisdictions duty is narrowly construed. Moreover, the factors determining 
standard of care demonstrate a similar concern for reasonableness, albeit with a difference in 
                                                          
108 See e.g. Syme v Scottish Borders Council 2003 S.L.T. 601 at para 5; Macdonald v Scottish Ministers 2004 Rep. L.R. 16 
109 Text at fn 40 above.  
110 Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council 2014 S.C. 114 per Lord Drummond Young at para 54. 
111 J H Tait, “Is Duncan v. Findlater not Law?” (1898) 10 Jur. Rev. 200; see also A M MacRobert, “The liability of public 
bodies for non-feasance” (1902) 14 Jur. Rev. 158. This proposal is now incompatible with Lord Drummond Young’s 
assessment in Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council that “Scots law is quite coherent as it stands and has no need to move 
into line with English law” (2014 S.C. 114 at para 54). 
112 Cited above at text to fn 4. Indeed it is not clear why, e.g., Lady Paton recorded her views on the subject in the 
present tense: see fn 5 above.  
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onus in regard to failure to repair that is if anything more helpful to English litigants. English law 
now provides an invaluable source of comparative authority, as long as the respective sources are 
properly contextualised and the praesumptio similitudinis does not blind us to their differences.  
